THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
ROUND TABLE

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WANTED:
30,000,000 MEN

A Radio Discussion by

- BRIG. GEN. HERSHEY
- LEO M. CHERNE
- NEIL H. JACOBY

425th BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY • 213

APRIL 12, 1942

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

REG. U.S. PAT. OFF.

Published weekly. 10 cents a copy; five copies, 25 cents; full-year subscription, 52 issues, two dollars. Published by the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. Entered as second-class matter January 3, 1939, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

No. 213

NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the following text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following the transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to use for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussion leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcript helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

WANTED:
30,000,000 MEN

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

BRIGADIER GENERAL LEWIS B. HERSHEY, National Director Selective Service

LEO M. CHERNE, Executive Secretary, Research Institute of America; Lecturer, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service

NEIL H. JACOBY, Business School, University of Chicago; Secretary of the University

* A radio discussion broadcast from Washington, D.C., over the Red Network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, April 12, 1942, at 2:30 P.M., Eastern War Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and exchange data and views. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

WANTED:
30,000,000 MEN

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For critical materials the nation can find substitutes, but there is no substitute for manpower. According to Donald Nelson, "this war will be won only if there is sweat and action on the production line to match the blood and action on the battle line." Plants and battlefronts are placing an unprecedented call upon the manpower of America.

Just how large an armed force must America place in the field to win this war? How many millions of men will be needed to produce the arms for victory? What will become of civilian industry under this double pressure? What is the purpose of the "Selective Service Occupational Questionnaire," which will be sent to 39,000,000 men this year?

To answer these and other questions of importance to every citizen, the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE *invited Brigadier General Lewis B. Hershey to participate in an informal discussion of "Wanted: 30,000,000 Men."*

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MR. JACOBY: Those forceful words we just heard about "sweat and action" on the production front were those of Donald Nelson, chairman of the War Production Board. Mr. Nelson also referred to "blood and action" on the battlefront. I wonder what he meant in terms of the number of men who will put on uniforms this year.

GENERAL HERSHEY: I think we've got to have more than four

million men in the armed forces at the end of the year. That means an increase of about two million men.[1]

On the industrial front how many men must we find to augment our workers?

MR. CHERNE: At the end of 1941 approximately five million men were employed on war production.[2] Before the end of 1942 that number must be increased by the use of men and women to at least fifteen million.

MR. JACOBY: Then it would seem that this year alone we will absorb about ten million men and women into war industries; another two million men will be absorbed into the armed forces, so that the draft on manpower in 1942 alone will be in the neighborhood of twelve million. But we want *thirty* million men; and when we speak of a thirty-million-man absorption we are looking, I take it, into the future, when the war effort will reach a fuller magnitude.

General, what do we expect to be the total absorption into the armed forces and war industry over, let us say, the next two years?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, Jacoby, we've got to have enough men to win the war; but I think that it takes a military prophet better than I am to attempt to predict the exact numbers that we'll have to have in the Army. And I think that probably Cherne, in considering an estimate of the number of men in industry, could give as good an estimate as I of the number of men that we can support.

MR. CHERNE: I'm not sure that prophecy is required as much as an analysis of both the military and the industrial plans. If I'm not mistaken, the military plans at the present time visualize a

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[1] *There were 2,071,000 men in the armed forces at the end of November, 1941, when last data of this type were available. (Department of Labor.)*

[2] *See illustration, page 14.*

possible, if not probable, Army of eight million men and Navy of one million—a total of between nine and ten million men in uniform before this war is over. Isn't that correct?

General Hershey: Well, I should think that we've got to figure in rather large numbers if we expect to win the war.

Mr. Jacoby: Then, when we say, "Wanted: Thirty Million Men," we mean that we'll want perhaps ten million in uniform and twenty million in industry, supporting the war.

Let's look, for a moment, at our manpower resources, from which that huge volume of men must come. There are about one hundred and thirty-three million people in the United States, according to the census of 1940, of which about seventy-two million are between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five. That is, they are not too young or too old to fight or to work in war. Are all those seventy-two million potentially available for the purposes for which we're going to require them, General?

General Hershey: Normally in figuring in round numbers, I think of sixty million as representing the productive units between seventeen or eighteen and sixty-five. Now, that may be a little high, but I figure around forty million men and twenty million women. That does not include the ones above sixty-five or the ones below sixteen; and from those groups some active productive units might be secured.[3]

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[3] *According to an estimate in "Fortune," the potential labor force numbers about 71,000,000 men and women. Of the 66,200,000 males reported in the census of 1940, 2,600,000 are over sixty-five years of age; 2,200,000 between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five are disabled; 19,600,000 are under eighteen years of age; and 41,800,000 are potential workers. Of the 65,400,000 females reported in the census, 4,300,000 are over sixty-five years of age; 1,700,000 between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five are disabled; 10,700,000 are married, with children under ten years of age; 19,500,000 are under eighteen years*

INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS: WASTE OF MANPOWER

Man-Days Lost in Industrial Accidents in 1940



EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS 2,500,000 MAN-DAYS

Man-days lost in strikes are included in this illustration for purposes of comparison.

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of age; and 29,200,000 are potential workers. In the potential working force "Fortune" includes 400,000 mothers with children under ten who now work; 1,300,000 boys and girls under eighteen who work or seek work; 2,100,000 men and women over sixty-five who work or seek work; and 16,200,000 high-school or college students and others who are not normally in the labor force. ("Arms and the Manpower," "Fortune," April, 1942.)

MR. CHERNE: They will probably no more than offset the groups within the ages seventeen to sixty-five that will not be used and probably can't be used—those who, for a number of reasons, are not available for military service or industrial activity.

MR. JACOBY: Well, the Bureau of Labor Statistics said that our manpower at the end of 1942 would be about fifty-seven and a half million, of which around four million would be in the armed forces; eight and a half million on farms; two and a half million, roughly, unemployed; and about forty-two million in factories and in mines. So that those are the people upon whom we're going to have to rely to supply the thirty million we need. [*See illustration, page 9.*] And it's pretty obvious to me that those people are going to have to go into the Army or into war production from other jobs. They are not going to come from the home or from the unemployed.

MR. CHERNE: As a matter of fact, Jacoby, of the ten million new men and women needed in war industry before the end of 1942, more than seven million will come from other jobs, most of them from nonessential industry, and some of them from some very essential industry in war work.

MR. JACOBY: You used a key word there, "*essential*" industry. That means we are facing an enormous problem of selection—one that General Hershey is wrestling with now. We must select from the least-essential jobs; we must select people from the proper age groups and the people who do not have heavy dependency for service in the armed forces. That is the heart of the Selective Service problem. I'd like to consider those three questions in turn—age, occupation, and dependency. What is the proposed policy of the Selective Service System with regard to age?

GENERAL HERSHEY: At the present time the age group from twenty to forty-five is liable for registration and liable for service. The group from forty-five to sixty-five is liable for registration only.

And the eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds, while only liable for registration, are growing rapidly, we may say, toward twenty, which is their age of liability for service.

MR. JACOBY: Well, fifteen days from now, men forty-five to sixty-five years of age are going to register under the Selective Service Act. This is an age group that never before has been called upon to register in our national history, and I imagine a good many are wondering why these older men should register at all if they're not to be called upon for military service.

MR. CHERNE: I'd like to answer that from the industrial point of view, because I think the main reason for registration of those between forty-five and sixty-five is industrial. The purpose of the registration is, substantially, to give us a record of the available skills so that the government or Selective Service or the Army and Navy in the future may say to men within these age groups: "You will either apply those skills for war purposes or for purposes that are necessary for the nation, or you fight." Isn't that true, General?

GENERAL HERSHEY: At the present time the main idea is to discover the skill so that you can go to the man and offer him a job commensurate with his skill. In the second place, psychologically, I think, the man over forty-five is encouraged by the fact that his abilities are of enough importance to the government that the government will ask him to make them a matter of record.

MR. JACOBY: I don't think we can overlook that psychological factor, when we recall that men up to the age of fifty-one are liable for army service in Britain, and I understand that there is no age limit whatever put on army service in Germany, providing a man can meet the necessary physical qualifications.

MR. CHERNE: As a matter of practical reality, though, those within the upper age groups are not available for military service

because of the difficulty of meeting the physical standards, even the relaxed physical standards, of the Army and Navy.

MR. JACOBY: Yes, but we shouldn't forget that there are many inactive jobs, noncombatant jobs, to be filled in the Army, and we may have to call upon the older group for those jobs at some later time.

MR. CHERNE: That's entirely correct.

MR. JACOBY: So much, then, for the policy with respect to age. What about occupational deferment? I think a good many of my friends and acquaintances are quite in error in thinking that, just because a man has a job with the federal government or is working in a defense plant, he's going to be automatically deferred, without consideration. I understand that is wrong.

GENERAL HERSHEY: You are right. The law very specifically says that, outside of ministers of the Gospel and seminary students and a few (a very few) in the government, no one shall be exempted from military service, except that the determination is made on the basis of the individual. And for that reason, in the last eighteen months we have been able to see many of our people deferred because they had dependents, even though they had no occupational skills. Now, more and more we're going to have to consider what criteria we shall use in making occupational deferments.

MR. JACOBY: In other words, when you want thirty million men, you can't afford to grant blanket deferments to whole industries or occupations. You can't have any "dugout" occupations during wartime.

MR. CHERNE: As a matter of fact there has never been any blanket deferment for any industry or occupation under the present Selective Service Act. I think the change, and the trend, will be in this direction: The entire impact of war will take large segments of

STRUCTURE OF LABOR FORCE AT THE END OF 1942

An Estimate of the Department of Labor



business and either completely put them out of the picture or very much weaken their economic position. The result will be that men who were formerly in Class II-A because they held key positions in these industries will no longer be entitled to a deferment for the simple reason that their former business either no longer exists or is no longer of any importance to the nation.

GENERAL HERSHEY: I agree with that. I think we must look at

it this way: If a man is doing something of a very material benefit, either in the war effort or in the supporting effort, to carry on what the government is attempting to do, then if he has no other reason for deferment he must be deferred until he can be replaced. Production must go on; and it must increase where we need the increases.

Mr. Jacoby: Would it be fair to say that every unmarried man is going to be asked these two questions by his draft board with regard to his request for occupational deferment: "Are you working in an essential industry?" and "Are you irreplaceable in that industry?"

General Hershey: Yes, I think that's fair. And in that the employer has a very definite responsibility. First, he must ask for the men whom he needs. We call that a "42-A." That's the way he puts in his request.

Mr. Jacoby: So that both the employer who refuses to file any 42-A's—that is, request deferment for any of his men—and, on the other hand, the employer who requests deferment for all of them are not doing a service to the Selective Service System or to their country.

General Hershey: The employer is not doing his service to the country; he's not sharing his knowledge and responsibility, which every citizen must share in a democracy.

Mr. Cherne: More than 64 per cent of the men who were of draft age who have been registered and classified have been deferred because of dependency. Now we reach a point where dependency is first of all being de-emphasized and may, before many months elapse, be very unimportant.

General Hershey: I find myself a little bit in the position of being both a prophet and an administrator. I agree that we all seek for security, but in these times of national stress there is no security.

While Selective Service has been trying hard to protect both family life and the necessary industries, yet, as time goes on, we may be compelled, in order to protect family life, to take some of the men who have dependents but who are doing nothing that is materially in the government's interest.

Mr. Jacoby: And the problems of their families will be met, I presume, by passage of some bill (a number of which are now pending in Congress) to make allowance allotments to the families?

General Hershey: I think one of those bills will pass, but I do not think that the public should get in their mind that the passage of that bill means the induction of every man who has dependents.

Mr. Cherne: General, I'd like to borrow your prophet's mantle for a moment and indicate what I think will very probably happen by the end of 1942 in the case of dependency.

I personally believe that dependency, the present III-A classification, will be divided up so that additional emphasis will be placed in most cases on what the man is doing rather than upon who his dependents are. If an individual has both dependents and is occupied in essential activity, I think that very probably he will be placed in Class III-B, a preferred class of dependents. If, on the other hand, he is not doing any essential work, then he may be in III-A and may, in some cases (if his wife is capable of supporting herself, or if there are no children), be placed automatically in I-A. Is my prophecy sound?

General Hershey: I think you have lived up to your past reputation of being a very good prophet. And I believe if I were in some of those classes you've discussed, I'd take to heart very seriously in my future planning the things that you have indicated as things that may happen in the next year.

MR. JACOBY: I think there is one point that deserves notation here, and that is that, even if an allowance for dependents is set up in order to permit these men who have families to go into the Army, the dependents' allowance is going to work a certain amount of hardship on the family with above-average income, because necessarily it won't be possible to pay a different number of dollars to every family. And, also, it's likely to work a little hardship on people living in the big cities, where the costs of living are somewhat above the national average. But those are things that we'll have to take in our stride in the national interest.

These are all very important questions—age, occupation, and dependency. I wonder if you can summarize, rather briefly, the policies that will be pursued by Selective Service this year in regard to them?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I think we ought to remember that our liability ages are twenty to forty-five and that we have a pool of men above forty-five who are going to be used for jobs and a pool of men below twenty who are growing into liability for service.

I think we ought to think more and more as time goes on that what a man does to win this war is going to have increasing importance and that the government must make arrangements, by allotment allowances and other ways, to take care of the dependents and other things that are in any way connected with preventing a man from doing the things he must do to win the war.

MR. JACOBY: Very well said. Now, I have before me a very formidable document called "Selective Service Occupational Questionnaire." Beginning next week, about nine million men are going to receive a copy of this questionnaire; and eventually all of the thirty-nine million men who have registered or will register in Selective Service will get it. On it are listed about two hundred occupations. Each man is asked to state the length of time that he has

worked at these selected occupations, if he has had any experience in them.

We are very fortunate, General, to have you here today to give this first nation-wide radio discussion of the occupational questionnaire. How were these selected occupations devised? And for what reason is the questionnaire being submitted?

General Hershey: The questionnaire was built up by many governmental agencies and many private agencies, but the United States Employment Service is primarily responsible and has a primary interest in these selected occupations you've mentioned. They are attempting to find men who either now have these occupations and work at them or have them as latent capacities, so that they can place these people in jobs. These are the skills in which they are interested at the present time.

Mr. Cherne: In other words, this is really our first approach to a national inventory of labor skills, particularly those skills that become important for the war effort.

General Hershey: That's right.

Mr. Jacoby: I must say that I was rather surprised at the comparatively small number of occupations listed. Of course, I know that you can't list all of them, but the Government Occupational Classification lists about twenty-nine thousand different kinds of jobs, and only two hundred are listed on this list of selected occupations.

General Hershey: Some of these jobs probably cover several in the twenty-nine-thousand or the thirty-thousand group. On the other hand, these are the ones they are interested in now; and obviously many of the thirty thousand are not of particular moment now. Either there are no shortages or they are not vital to the war effort.

WAR WILL CHANGE THE USE OF AMERICA'S LABOR FORCE*

CHANGES IN CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT UNDER WAR PRESSURE

* *Estimates from "Fortune," April, 1942.*

Mr. Cherne: If I understand the purpose of the questionnaire correctly, the United States Employment Service, on the basis of this questionnaire, wants to be able to go to any individual who has a skill needed for defense but who is shown by the questionnaire not to be employing that skill now and, by the process of interviewing him, find out first of all if that skill actually does exist and whether he may or may not be more profitably employed in war production.

General Hershey: That's correct.

Mr. Jacoby: There is one point I think ought to be pointed out, and that is that the mere fact that a man is now employed in one of these two hundred selected occupations does not mean he will be granted an occupational deferment from Army service. Am I right, General?

General Hershey: That's right. The fact that a man has a vital skill does not necessarily mean he will be deferred now. And, if he is deferred now, his employer is responsible for training a replacement.

Mr. Jacoby: Our discussion so far certainly adds up to the idea that the draft boards throughout the nation are going to comb their lists of manpower with a very fine-tooth comb. As a result of that combing, business concerns are going to face tremendous personnel readjustments. I imagine that we will find businessmen who have been thinking in terms of personnel in a very selective way—that is, they have been used to drawing on a reserve supply of four to twelve million unemployed—who are going to have to change their whole pattern of thinking and consider hiring people who have heretofore not been regarded as employable.

Mr. Cherne: That's entirely true. The American executive and the new science he's learned within the last twenty years—personnel selection—have both been very fussy. I don't think the Ameri-

can employer is going to be quite that fussy during the months ahead. Before 1943 is over, not only will he not be fussy but he will be employing persons who previously he thought would never enter his plant. And I think it is a very good thing for our democratic economic society.

MR. JACOBY: For example, he will employ the middle-aged worker, women, people with minor physical defects, and members of races which have previously, and unfortunately, been discriminated against in employment.

MR. CHERNE: That's right.

MR. JACOBY: All those are going to be drafted into work.

MR. CHERNE: These are just some of the effects of the entire problem of labor supply. Manpower is, unfortunately, the one asset in our national economy for which no substitute can be found; and manpower may prove to be, before this war is over, the most difficult to get of all war requirements.

We have, and we will have, as a result of this shortage, nondefense business, nondefense industry, pinched on *two* sides—pinched by the shortage of materials, on the one hand, and pinched by the inability to get labor to process those materials, on the other.

MR. JACOBY: A great many service occupations are going to suffer. For example, the beauty-parlor business. The operators can now get jobs in defense industries, so it loses its personnel. And, on the other hand, they can't get drying and curling machines, so they lose their materials. And I presume a great many of them will simply have to close up for the duration.

GENERAL HERSHEY: If you're going to get thirty million men and women into industry and into the armed forces, you must take them from somewhere.

MR. CHERNE: I think the need for labor will have a very fortu-

nate effect on our war economy. Some nondefense business has been content, and probably still is, to continue with normal production. Thus far they've been pinched only by the shortage of materials. When, added to that burden, there is the impossibility of securing labor, I believe you'll see conversion to war production, or at least the frenzied effort to convert to war production, that in some circles has not yet occurred, despite the fact we are very much at war.

Mr. Jacoby: I think we have come to the conclusion that perhaps these enormous readjustments in the occupational structure of our society will not be brought about in a free labor market; that we shall have to resort to some forms of compulsion, of *telling* people, instead of *inducing* them by wage rates, where they ought to work and how long.

General, what is your view with regard to the compulsory allocation of labor supply, or the mobilization of labor?

General Hershey: I am very much in favor of not using wages for the purpose of moving labor about. I think that practice is very unfortunate. I do think that we're going to have to encourage men to go and to stay in places where we need them. I think we must discourage them, perhaps by not giving them deferments, in order to move them from places where they are now, in addition to the handling of your priorities. I think that the nation will demand that we use the controls we must, but I have always hoped that we would justify our interest and belief in democracy by making possible what we must do without too many compulsions.

Mr. Jacoby: Well, take a specific industry. I suspect that agriculture in this war, as in the last, is going to face a difficult squeeze. A good many farmers and their employees are leaving the farms for the cities, where they work in war industry or for the Army. Thousands of the transient laborers who used to roam up and down the Pacific Coast, helping farmers harvest their fruit and other crops, have been absorbed into the plane plants. How is the farmer going

to face these issues? Is he going to have to work harder himself, or will it be necessary in this country, as it was in Germany, to draft high-school boys and girls at certain seasons of the year into the harvesting operation?

MR. CHERNE: The difficulty in the case of agriculture is one of the most acute problems that our war administration faces, but it's merely typical of a number of the problems, and here are just a few: One employer hoards skilled labor, keeping them in jobs that semi-skilled or common labor could do as well; another may raid his competitor's labor supply; while a third gives the wage-price-profits spiral a hike by recklessly raising pay rolls that the government has to foot anyway. These are all consequences not only of the shortened labor supply but of the free competition between employers for available labor or the balance of the labor market.

MR. JACOBY: Don't we then move to the conclusion that, before we're finished with this job, we're going to have to set up some kind of central agency?

MR. CHERNE: I think General Hershey, on another occasion, actually expressed a key to that entire problem. I'd like to quote what he said at that time. "If you're going to use manpower wholly and efficiently, you have to allocate it on a central plan and not as each particular man decides or desires his part should be." He also added that "you are going to have to distribute your cream, your rich milk, your skimmed milk, and the bottom of your milk, where you can use it"; and I think that is the essence of our labor-allocation and manpower-mobilization problems.

MR. JACOBY: If we followed that solution, we'd only be profiting by the experience gained from the last war. We all know that after the last war the army set up the so-called "M-Day," or Mobilization Day Plan, which called for a national labor administrator who would

have full power to allocate labor. So far we haven't followed that recommendation.[4]

General Hershey: There have probably been several reasons, and I am hoping that we try to keep our plans abreast of our operations, at least, because one of the most discouraging things is to not have prepared the next step in our plans.

Mr. Cherne: Gentlemen, I'd like to approach the entire problem of whether or not this can be dealt with voluntarily indirectly. The President has asked that the name for this war come from the people; and I'd like to suggest one of the unavoidable identifications: "The Total War." I suggest it because if we accept this war as such, and if we begin to approach our problem of manpower mobilization as we must—the mobilization of all phases of our economic life—then I think we are on the road to victory. This doesn't mean that the government drafts labor any more than it means that the government drafts capital. It does mean, though, that the planned use of American energies is as vital and unavoidable as the planned use of our industrial capacity, our materials, our machine tools, auto plants, tires, and gasoline. In other words, the individual, front-line soldier does not prepare his own battle strategy; nor, as a matter of war reality, can the industrialist at home or his worker.

Mr. Jacoby: Yes. We long ago, for example, gave up the idea of getting more steel by allowing a price boom in steel. So I think now it's high time we gave up the idea of shifting labor by allowing wage rates to fluctuate without limit. Would you agree, General?

General Hershey: I would.

Mr. Jacoby: It's not an exaggeration to say, I think, that the

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[4] *See the University of Chicago* Round Table *transcript, No. 122, July 14, 1940, "M-Day and America," with Leo M. Cherne, Herbert Heaton, and Quincy Howe.*

United States now faces a period of occupational readjustment far more drastic than ever has occurred before in an equal period of time. It will be a period of vast re-employment more than it will be a period of shifting employment. These shifts cannot be brought about through the personal decisions of millions of individuals; the needs are too urgent.

After the last war, the Army drew up plans for mobilizing the manpower. The day is fast approaching when the allocation of labor supply through some such plan will be necessary. We think every American will be glad to be told where and how he can best serve his country in bringing victory.

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. How great will be the draft on manpower in 1942 for military and industrial services? Page 4.
2. How great are the manpower resources of the United States? Page 4.
3. General Hershey estimates there are how many productive units of labor? What is their sex and age composition? Page 4.
4. What are the Department of Labor estimates of the 1942 labor force of the United States? Pages 6, 9.
5. What is the policy of the Selective Service system in regard to the different age groups? Page 7.
6. What is the upper age limit to liability for military service in Britain? In Germany? Page 7.
7. What is the policy of the Selective Service system in regard to occupational deferment? Page 8.
8. What percentage of the men classified in the draft age has been deferred because of dependency? Page 10.
9. What does General Hershey say will be the policies pursued this year by Selective Service with regard to age, occupation, and dependency? Page 12.
10. What is the purpose of the "Selective Service Occupational Questionnaire"? Page 13.
11. What is General Hershey's view in regard to the compulsory allocation of the labor supply? Page 18.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on page 24.

*

1. Discuss the size of the manpower resources and the manpower needs of the nation this year. The next two years.
2. What will be the policy this year in regard to occupational deferment and deferment for dependents?
3. How complete is the present mobilization of manpower? In your opinion, should compulsory allocation of manpower be adopted?
4. Would conscription of workers from civilian to war industry be effective?
5. What is the government doing to insure effective manpower utilization of large groups that have been subject to industrial discrimination—Negroes, Jews, women, friendly aliens, elderly persons, and those with physical handicaps?
6. Should the right to volunteer be withdrawn and all recruitment to the armed service be accomplished through Selective Service? Discuss.
7. What efforts are being made to use manpower with "selective efficiency"?
8. What is and will be the effect on non-war business of draining manpower into the armed services and war industry?

SUGGESTED READINGS

"Arms and the Manpower," *Fortune*, April, 1942. *Complete review of United States manpower resources.*

Culligan, Ernest M., *The Procurement of Man Power.* "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science." Philadelphia, March, 1942. *History of the steps that brought us to our present Selective Service system.*

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The Listeners' Round Table . . . .

Letters to the ROUND TABLE *frequently contain interesting and illuminating side lights on the subject matter discussed on the air. These comments are from letters received following the broadcast-discussion, "India," April 5, 1942.*

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Omissions

I feel compelled to express my evaluation of this afternoon's session of the ROUND TABLE on India as the low point of a progressively degenerating educational feature. It is with real sadness that I state this. For several years the ROUND TABLE has been an eagerly awaited event, but in proportion to the involvement of this country in the war the educational aspects of the program have died a lingering death.

Whether the cause of this degeneration has been the pressure of the crisis to select the safest speakers or simply the ignorance of the participants is a question beyond me.

While there was a sincere, even though halfhearted, attempt on the part of Quincy Wright to be objective about India and Britain, the discussion of India added more confusion than clarity to the picture. Granted that the problem of India is most complex, there are broad aspects of the problem that were definitely avoided and which seemed to me to offer an insult to intelligent citizens of a nation which claims to be fighting for freedom and democracy and against imperialism. Let me cite a few of these things:

1. Why was not a representative of India secured for the session?

2. Why did the participants all agree that the provisions of the Atlantic Charter applied to India? Officially England has denied this. Wouldn't it have been more honest to have agreed that those provisions "should" apply to India?

3. Is it scientific to attribute what social and economic progress has occurred in India under British rule to Britain's "benevolent" (or other) dictatorship? The innuendo is a false one —that without Britain no progress would have been achieved in India. An objective comparative study demonstrates that the innuendo is doubly misleading.

4. The whole question of education —a prerequisite of democracy—was mentioned but consciously evaded. Why hasn't Britain in her benevolence done more in this fundamental field?

5. Why was not the whole principle of self-government and political freedom discussed over an American

network? Was this not the perfect moment to sound the clarion call of all free men to a common faith in freedom and self-government? The Axis promises freedom, and India does not fall for it. Is it supposed that she will eagerly embrace the Allies, whose English proponents again talk about freedom only under the pressure of military reverses and whose American proponents don't even discuss it?

6. Such items as the silence on England's part in the Indian communal problem, the official policy of "divide and rule," differences in requirements of Hindus and Moslems to engage in public and political activities, the comparison of Moslem participation in the Indian National Congress with that of the All-India Moslem League, the true and objective figures in regard to birth and death rates, longevity, etc., are too numerous to be mentioned in this brief letter.

In my comments I do not desire to be anti-British. I am being much more restrained than sensitive Englishmen have been for generations. But I felt compelled to write in the face of such superficial treatment of this great problem, while men die on battle fronts or rot in prisons in the name of human liberty and freedom.

K. C., Illinois

*

Best

Today's discussion on India seemed to me one of the best I have heard. You answered a number of questions which have been in my mind—about conditions there and the general tangle of problems. I was especially interested in that item about the still low literacy. I had been meaning to hunt up the answers but was busy with "here and now."

I have listened a great deal in the last two years to the British broadcasts and have been impressed with the sincerity of the present effort to find a solution toward Indian independence. I do not believe the sins of the past should be held against those who are now making that sincere effort.

D. C. R., Connecticut

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Superficial

Yesterday's broadcast on India was neither spontaneous nor enlightening. In fact it was highly disappointing to hear three supposedly erudite gentlemen discuss a subject so vitally important in these crucial times in such a superficial manner. Their "debate" (?) definitely showed that all three participants know very little of the political and economic problems of India, and I am confident that none of them has traveled in India. If they have, they did it with a Baedeker or reference book.

The Indian states number 560 and not 600 as either Clark or Wright stated. Also for the information of all three "experts," India was always united economically, and the peoples of India—Hindus, Mohammedans, Animists, Buddhists, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, and Parsees alike—are

interested only in complete freedom and independence of English domination and exploitation. This attitude of the Indian people was expounded time and time again by their leaders, and only a few months ago, in December, 1941, to be exact, the Congress party of India, at Bardoli, adopted a resolution to that effect. The Indian people are hostile to the British government and distrust same, and for good reason.

J. W. N., Illinois

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163. *Lessons from Europe's War*
164. *The Effect of the Blitzkrieg on the Economic Order*
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177. *Defense: Who'll Pay the Piper?*
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191. *Defense Inventory*
192. *The Philippines*
193. *Little Business: What Now?*
194. *Labor's Responsibility in Defense*
195. *Canada: Neighbor at War*
196. *Civil Rights and "Public Danger"*
197. *Manpower: The Key to Victory*
198. *What Does Rationing Mean?*

1942

199. *Morale: Ours and Theirs*
200. *How To Meet the Menace of Inflation*
201. *Censorship*
202. *How United Are the Americas?*
203. *Are We Overconfident?*
204. *Labor Policies in Wartime*
205. *What Should the Churches Do in War?*
206. *What Should We Teach Our Youth Now?*
207. *Propaganda: Good and Bad*
208. *Civilian Defense*
209. *Taxes* vs. *Axis*
210. *Women, Work, and the War*
211. *The American Temper*
212. *India.* April 5

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Do You Understand the Economics of War?

You should read: *Defense Inventory* (*191*), *Little Business: What Now?* (*193*), *What Does Rationing Mean?* (*198*), and *How To Meet the Menace of Inflation* (*200*).

ROUND TABLE NETWORK OF 102 STATIONS

2:30 P.M. EASTERN WAR TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Manchester, N.H.	WFEA	1370
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Baltimore, Md.	WBAL	1090	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Boston, Mass.	WNAC	1260	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060
Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	930	Pittsburgh, Pa.	KDKA	1020
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Dayton, Ohio	WING	1410	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930	Wilmington, Dela.	WDEL	1150
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340	Zanesville, O.	WHIZ	1240

1:30 P.M. CENTRAL WAR TIME

Amarillo, Texas	KGNC	1440	Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1310
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Bristol, Tenn.	WOPI	1490	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1500
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Eau Claire, Wis.	WEAU	1070	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
El Paso, Texas	KTSM	1380	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Pittsburg, Kans.	KOAM	810
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WGL	1450	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Fort Worth, Texas	KGKO	570	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1400	San Antonio, Texas	WOAI	1200
Indianapolis, Ind.	WIRE	1430	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Jackson, Miss.	WJDX	1300	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Laurel, Miss.	WAML	1340	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920	Wichita, Kans.	KANS	1240

12:30 P.M. MOUNTAIN WAR TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1030	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Yuma, Arizona	KYUM	1240
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240			

11:30 A.M. PACIFIC WAR TIME

Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	San Diego, Cal.	KFSD	600
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590
Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530			

STATIONS CARRYING ROUND TABLE BY TRANSCRIPTION

Cincinnati, Ohio	WSAI	1360	10:30 P.M. E.W.T.
Milwaukee, Wis.	WTMJ	620	4:00 P.M. C.W.T.

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APRIL 19, 1942

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THURMAN ARNOLD

United States Assistant Attorney-General

(OTHER SPEAKERS TO BE ANNOUNCED)

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SUGGESTED READINGS

"Arms Profits," *Newsweek,* February 2, 1942.
HUTCHINSON, KEITH, "War Profits for Railroads," *Nation,* February 21, 1942.
STRAIGHT, MICHAEL, "Dollar-a-Year Sabotage," *New Republic,* March 30, 1942.
"War Profit Curb," *Business Week,* January 31, 1942.

PRINTED IN U.S.A.